Message Text

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EXDIS

E.O.11652:GDS

TAGS: EAID, EFIN, CB

SUBJECT: SEVERE INFLATION IN CAMBODIA

REF: PHNOM PENH 13325

1. APPRECIATE YOUR ANALYSIS REFTEL. YOUR POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS NOW UNDER INTERAGENCY REVIEW. ON WHOLE YOUR PROPOSALS FAVORABLY RECEIVED HERE. YOUR ANTICIPATED ADDITIONAL FUNDING NEEDS POSE SEVERE PROBLEMS FOR US TO WHICH WE WILL ATTEMPT TO RESPOND AFTER COMPLETING OUR REVIEW HERE OF YOUR REQUIREMENTS AND OVERALL A.I.D. FUNDING AVAILABILITIES.

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2. WE CONCUR IN YOUR ASSESSMENT THAT DECREASE IN SUPPLY OF GOODS IS CHIEF CAUSE OF CURRENT SEVERE INFLATION. THE IM PACT OF THIS REDUCTION IN BOTH DOMESTIC AND IMPORTED GOODS FLOWS ON PRICES MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN MAGNIFIED BY DECREASING

AREA AND POPULATION UNDER GKR CONTROL. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS YOU MAY HAVE RE POSSIBLE WIDE SCALE FLIGHT FROM RIELS INTO GOODS AND INCREASES IN THE VELOCITY OF CIRCULATION OF MONEY. FROM OUR LESS ADVANTAGED VIEWPOINT WE WOULD BE LESS INCLINED TO SUSPECT SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN VELOCITY. THE 275 PERCENT RATE OF INFLATION SHOULD LONG AGO HAVE EATEN UP CONSUMER SAVINGS. EXCEPT FOR

SAVINGS, IT WOULD SEEM THAT THE INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS UNDERLYING VELOCITY (E.G., LENGTH OF WAGE PERIOD) ARE QUITE RIGID IN A SITUATION WHERE SUCH LARGE NUMBERS ARE ON THE GOVERNMENT PAYROLL. SIMILARLY, WE WOULD THINK THAT THE SECURITY SITUATION AND DIMINISHMENT OF REAL CONSUMER PURCHASING POWER WOULD MITIGATE AGAINST SPECULATIVE COMMODITY HOARDING.

- 3. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION YOU COULD OFFER ON HOW SUPPLY OF BASIC CONSUMER NECESSITIES OTHER THAN RICE MIGHT BE AUGMENTED. WE BELIEVE IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE WITHOUT INORDINATE EXPENDITURES TO IMPOR FROM VIETNAM OR OTHER SEA COUNTRIES ITEMS SUCH AS FISH, VEGETABLES, ETC. BASED ON PRICE DATA AVAILABLE HERE ON BASIC FOOD STUFF IN CAMBODIA AND VIETNAM, BELIEVE WE CAN MAKE SOME PRICE COMPARISONS. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY THOUGHTS YOU HAVE ON THIS MATTER, INCLUDING POSSIBLE EXCHANGE RATE CHANGES NEEDED TO FACILITATE SUCH IMPORTS, AND POSSIBILITIES OF ARRANGING COORDINATED GKR-GVN TRANSPORTATION OF SUCH COMMODITIES. (AS A CODE 941 COUNTRY, VIETNAM IS, OF COURSE, CURRENTLY ELIGIBLE FOR CIP PROCUREMENT OF FOODSTUFFS).
- 4. REQUEST FURTHER CLARIFICATION ON YOUR PROPOSED RICE STRATEGY. PROPOSAL SEEMS SOUND, BUT WE MUST RESERVE JUDGMENT TILL WE KNOW MORE OF THE DETAILS AND THE MECHANICS OF THE PROPOSED SYSTEM. "FLOODING" THE MARKET WITH RICE AND ESTABLISHING A WORKABLE PRICE CEILING WILL REQUIRE THAT THE GKR COMPLETELY, AND ON A SUSTAINED BASIS, SECRET

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MEET MARKET DEMAND AT THE PROPOSED PRICE. IN THIS CONTEXT SEVERAL POINTS EMERGE. IN A NEAR MONOPSONISTIC BUYING SITUATION SUCH AS WOULD PREVAIL IN BATTAMBANG, IT IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE WHAT PRICE WOULD BE REQUIRED TO CLEAR THE MARKET. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT THE REQUIRED PRICE COULD BE ABOVE THAT REQUIRED TO PROVIDE A DEFLATIONARY SHOCK TO THE PHNOM PENH MARKET. EVEN IF THE BATTAMBANG RICE CAN BE ACQUIRED, THERE REMAINS THE PRO BLEM OF GETTING IT TO PHNOM PENH. MOREOVER, THE AMOUNT OF RICE REQUIRED TO SUSTAIN ANY GIVEN PRICE IN THE PHNOM PENH MARKET IS NOT CALCULABLE WITH ANY DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE. EVEN WITH ADDITIONAL U.S. AND BATTAMBANG RICE, THE GKR WOULD HAVE TO BE PREPARED TO DIP DEEPLY INTO STOCKS.

WOULD THIS BE FEASIBLE WHILE THE MEKONG INTERDICTION THREAT REMAINS?

5. WE HAVE SEVERAL TECHNICAL QUESTIONS ON THE MECHANICS OF THE RICE MARKETING SYSTEM. WHAT IS THE PROPOSED MECHANISM FOR CHANNELING THE RICE INTO THE PRIVATE

SECTOR - WILL THE GKR SELL RICE IN UNLIMITED QUANTITIES TO ALL PERSONS (OR MERCHANTS) AT THE 8,000 RIEL PRICE? HOW WILL BALANCE BE MAINTAINED BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SEC TOR SALES AT RETAIL LEVEL? CAN WE ASSUME THAT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE PROPOSED 9,000 RIEL MARKET PRICE AND 8,000 RIEL GKR PRICE WILL REPRESENT ALLOWABLE RETAIL MARGIN? WILL THIS PRICE DIFFERENIAL BE PRESERVED THROUGH LIMITING ELIGIBILITY FOR RICE PURCHASES FROM THE GKR, SETTING LARGE MINIMUM TRANSACTION QUANTITIES FOR GKR SALES OR BY OTHER MEANS? WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE ANY ADDITIONAL THINKING YOU MAY HAVE ON THE INCREMENTAL RICE REQUIREMENT.

- 6. REQUEST YOUR THINKING ON INTRODUCTION OF FINANCIAL RATE (ALSO APPLICABLE TO EXPORTS) WHICH WOULD BE TRULY FLOATED. BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO SUCH A SCHEME.
- 7. BELIEVE THE SALARY RATE INCREASE QUESTION SHOULD CONTINUE TO RECEIVE VERY CAREFUL ATTENTION. WE WOULD APPRECIATE MISSION THINKING ON POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF HOLDING THE WAGE INCREASE TO 15 PERCENT. REALIZE THAT A SECRET

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GREATER RATE OF INCREASE IN PUBLIC SECTOR WAGES WOULD FURTHER INCREASE THE GROWTH OF MONEY SUPPLY, BUT IN THIS CASE THE WAGE RATE LAG HAS BEEN SO GREAT AS TO MAKE A SOMEWHAT LARGER WAGE INCREASE APPEAR TO BE THE LEAST OF THESE EVILS. ASIDE FROM DISTRIBUTIONAL BENEFITS, THIS MIGHT ALSO MAKE YOUR PROPOSED EXCHANGE RATE POLICY MORE POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE TO GKR. IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF MISSION COULD SUPPLY INFORMATION ON THE DEGREE TO WHICH CIVIL SER VICE AND MILITARY WAGES ERODED OVER CY 1973.

- 8. REGARDING RELATIONS WITH THE IMF, BELIEVE EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO REDUCE POSSIBILITY OF CONFRONTATION (BOTH HERE AND THERE). WE ARE, HOWEVER, PREPARED TO TAKE SOME RISK SINCE IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT A PROGRAM AS BROAD AS YOU SUGGEST COULD ONLY BE IMPLEMENTED WITH A MORE DIRECT U.S. INVOLVEMENT. WE WILL TRY TO PAVE WAY WITH IMF WASHINGTON STAFF ONCE PACKAGE IS FINALIZED.
- 9. REQUEST RESPONSE PRIOR TO PRESENTATION OF PACKAGE TO GKR. RUSH

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